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Case Study Report - Infrastructure Funding in Germany 
 
Institutional / Planning Structure 
The responsibilities for transport planning and transport investment decisions in Germany are 
described in the following as an example for infrastructure funding in a cooperative federal 
system. As a federally organised nation Germany has a vertically tiered system of 
responsibilities. The legislative, executive and jurisdictional powers are separated between the 
federal level (Bund), the federal states (Bundesländer), and communities (Gemeinden).  
The division of responsibilities between the federal and state level follows two principles: 
firstly the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that decisions are generally taken on a 
decentralised basis, with federal competences defined in the constitution. The second 
important principle is that of a cooperative federalism or division of power in contrast to a 
separation of powers (as e.g. in the USA). In the cooperative system, a major part of 
legislation is decided on the federal level, while the states are responsible for the 
implementation. The legislative power of the German federal government can either be 
executive, where the states only get legislative power if federal law explicitly authorizes them 
(Basic Law / “Grundgesetz” GG Art.71), or competing with the federal states being 
authorized for legislation as long as the federal level does not make use of its legislation rights 
(GG Art. 72). The reduced self-determination of states in the cooperative system is 
compensated by strong participatory rights in federal decision-making (Börzel, 2002). Thus, 
in all matters of the Federation that concern the states’ interests, the states participate in the 
federal legislation and administration through the Bundesrat, the Federal Council / Upper 
House of Parliament (GG Art. 50) and representation of the federal states in the German 
federal system.  
The relationship amongst the federal states in Germany is also determined by the cooperative 
federalism with the states aiming at a coordination of politics on several levels, e.g. in the 
Bundesrat and its committees as well as other joint boards. For transport policy the most 
important committees for coordinating decisions on the state level are the Committee on 
Transport of the Bundesrat (Verkehrsausschuss des Bundesrats) and the Conference of 
Ministers of Transport (VMK - Verkehrsministerkonferenz). The federal Ministry of 
Transport, Housing and Building (BMVBW) is invited as a guest to the VMK. Its meetings 
and decisions are prepared by the Conference of Heads of Transport Departments (VALK) 
and the Conference of Heads of Department for Road Construction (LKS) from the states. 
Besides, five state working groups (e.g. on rail transport or on the Federal Transport 
Infrastructure Plan) and joint federal-state committees provide input for the VALK and LKS. 
This system of cooperative federalism is mirrored in the system of transport planning and 
investment decisions in Germany. The federal level is generally responsible for planning, 
construction, maintenance and operation of federal roads and trunk roads (Bundesfernstraßen: 
Autobahnen and Bundesstraßen), federal railways (Deutsche Bahn Netz AG as part of 
Deutsche Bahn AG), and inland waterways. Airports and sea ports fall under the 
responsibility of the states, with their connection to the surface transport modes covered on 
the federal level. The main instrument of federal infrastructure planning is the federal 
infrastructure master plan, identifying the need for federal transport infrastructure projects and 
corresponding lists of projects (development acts) as part of federal legislation 
(Fernstraßenausbaugesetz etc.). A comprehensive overview of the national infrastructure 
planning process of Germany can be found in Rothengatter (2005a). Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the political process and the role of the planning bodies in this process. The 
transport master plan contains a list of priority projects for investments, ranked according to 
the results of a project appraisal comprising a monetary cost-benefit analysis, an 
environmental risk assessment and a spatial development assessment plus some additional 
political criteria such as European interconnectivity or intermodal integration. Additionally, a 
quota system is applied to provide for a fair distribution of investments between the states. 
The states among other bodies have the right to apply for funding and issue lists of potential 
projects as an input to the transport master planning process, and they are consulted in the 
planning process after the project appraisal has been carried out and a first draft of priority 
lists for transport infrastructure investments has been developed by the Ministry of Transport. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Political Process of Federal Transport Infrastructure Planning in Germany 
(Source: Rothengatter, 2005a, p. 37) 
 
Investment Figures 
Besides the 2003 federal transport master plan with a total volume of 150 billion € for the 
time period 2001-2015, there have been several national initiatives for investments into the 
transport infrastructure. One of the largest of these, the 1999 “Investments for the Future” 
programme (Zukunftsinvestitionsprogramm) was set up from funds generated through the 
selling auction of UMTS licenses. It contained investments into road (7.1 billion €), rail (7.5 
billion €) and waterways (1.3 billion €) for the period 2001-2003. Due to the short time scale 
and the public accounting system which does not allow transferring funds into following 
years, however, it was difficult for the administrative authorities and the German railways to 
actually spend the funds in time. Germany additionally receives funding from the European 
Fund for Regional Development for infrastructure investments in the new federal states in 
eastern Germany. In 2005, the Federal Government decided to provide an additional sum of 
2 billion Euros for the period 2005 - 2008 for the improvement of transport infrastructure as 
part of their reform agenda for Germany (Agenda 2010). The projects that can be supported 
are taken out of the portfolio of the general master plan. Thus, these investments intend to 
accelerate the completion of priority projects. The funds are managed through the newly 
formed infrastructure financing agency (Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesellschaft 
VFIG) which allows for more flexibility in the horizontal and temporal allocation of funds. 
Responsibilities and Funding of Road Infrastructure 
While the overall responsibility lies with the federal level, the states administer the federal 
roads, i.e. they carry out the project planning, construction and operation on behalf of the 
federal level through their administrative bodies. The federal level retains the authority to 
control and issue instructions to the states and has the financial sovereignty in the investment 
decisions. Figure 2 depicts the general division of responsibilities in road planning and 
construction in Germany. Besides the federal roads, the states also plan and operate state 
(trunk roads) (Landesstraßen) within their own jurisdiction in consultation with the regional 
level and other stakeholders.  
Federal Infrastructure 
Planning Process 
in Germany 
(Rothengatter, 2005a) 
 
Figure 2:  The “Pyramid of Authorities” - General division of responsibilities between 
authorities for road planning and construction in Germany (Source: Grandjot, 2002, 
translated) 
Beckers et al. (2005) state in their analysis of the German Motorway procurement system a 
shortage of investments as a result of tight public budgets, inefficiencies of resource 
allocation due to the quota system in the project selection, delayed planning processes 
because of the administrative setup between federal and state tiers, and inefficiencies in the 
planning and construction processes. The division of power between federal level and states 
for the procurement of federal roads has been further analysed by the President of the Auditor 
General’s Office in Germany with respect to its economic efficiency (Engels, 2004). The 
conclusion of the report is that there are growing problems in particular regarding two issues: 
Firstly, the system of federal roads was originally designed for long-distance traffic but 
carries a considerable amount of regional traffic today, specifically on the highways. Besides, 
many highways have been converted by the states to federal roads which allowed them to 
claim federal funding. In the planning process, the bottom-up procedure leads to inefficiencies 
due to the assessment of more than 1500 single projects which are proposed by the different 
bodies. Proposals have been made to substitute this by a more strategic approach focussing on 
the federal planning objectives (see e.g. Wissenchaftlicher Beirat, 2000, Gühnemann et al., 
1999, pp. 364-367). Secondly, since the road administration and thus, considerable decision 
making power on many aspects of the road procurement is carried out on the state level on 
behalf of the federal government, the federal level lacks information and control over the 
efficiency of the process. Therefore, Engels (2004) proposes that all federal trunk roads be 
transferred to the full responsibility of the states and that a federal road administration be 
established with responsibility for the motorways which would remain a federal liability.  
Also, from a distributional point of view, the procurement of motorways in the Federal States 
doesn’t always seem to follow clear rules, rather political power and priorities, as figure 3 
indicates. Part of differences can be explained by size and population densities: small and 
densely populated states such as the cities of Hamburg and Bremen tend to have denser 
federal road networks while the per-capita provision is higher in large states such as Bayern 
or Niedersachsen. Some outliers can be explained by negative demographic development and 
regional development objectives in the new federal states after unification (Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Brandenburg). However, there are unexplainable exemptions such as a very 
low density of federal roads in the capital city of Berlin and comparably high per-capita 
provisions in Saarland. Clear investment rules and classification of roads according to their 
importance for federal interest could overcome part of the discrepancies. Another lesson 
learnt in the case of the new federal states in Eastern Germany is that infrastructure provision 
alone is not a suitable instrument for regional development and these investments need to be 
considered very carefully from an efficiency point of view. 
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Figure 3:  Motorway Network Density in the Federal States of Germany 
 
The co-ordination of investment decisions between states is organised via several committees, 
e.g. on the highest political level the Conference of Ministers of Transport (VMK - 
Verkehrsministerkonferenz), and joint working groups at lower decision levels. However, 
investments into the transport infrastructure are not always synchronised, and special 
problems arise in cross-national planning when a similar number of actors can be involved 
from a second country, leading to lengthy planning processes (see e.g. Fabian, 2005).  
Responsibilities and Funding of Rail Infrastructure 
In the case of national railway infrastructure projects, investments have to be agreed between 
the Federal government and the infrastructure company of the German railways, the DB Netz 
AG. The DB Netz AG has been formed after the Railway Reform of 1994 and is part of the 
DB AG holding (German railways), which is still 100% state owned but operates as a public 
limited company. As a general rule, the federal government funds infrastructure construction 
costs for priority projects included in the transport master plan as an interest free loan for 
which the network company has to back the annual depreciation. The share of the state 
contribution to the construction is negotiated between the company and the federal 
government with a possible elimination of projects if negotiations fail. The project 
implementation then lies with the DB Netz AG. As a consequence of heavy cost overruns on 
some projects, subsequent financial problems of the company and reduced maintenance of the 
existing network which lead to considerable problems with the reliability of rail services, also 
part of the reinvestment is paid for by the government (Rothengatter, 2005b). Overall, the 
efficiency of investments has improved due to the profitability interest of the DB AG (KCW 
et al., 2005). A major point of criticism is the vertical integration of the track and train 
operating companies under the auspices of the DB AG, introducing a discrimination potential 
in favour of investment decisions which would primarily benefit DB AG transport services. 
Moreover, the integration is regarded particularly critical in connection with a potential stock 
market flotation1 of the integrated DB AG with regard to its impact on network maintenance 
and competition as well as distributional effects (see e.g. KCW et. al, 2005).  
                                                 
1 This flotation is under consideration, the federal government is still in the consultation process, and a 
study comparing different alternatives has just been published (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006) 
Regional railway services have been the responsibility of the federal states since 
regionalisation in 1996. Services have to be announced by invitation to tender, which has led 
to a considerable increase in competition and transport volume in that market. For the 
network company of the DB AG the policy of the federal states plays an important role in 
their appraisal of the profitability of future investments. In order to avoid sunk costs by 
federal states deciding to terminate the subsidisation of services on certain routes and 
subsequent loss of track charges, the DB AG requested “infrastructure securing contracts” 
with the federal states, securing the provision of services and funding of reinvestments (see 
Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006).  
 
Responsibilities and Funding of Inland Waterways and Airports  
Investments into inland waterways are entirely the responsibility of the federal level, which 
is also in charge of their administration. Because of their high ecological risk, all inland 
waterway projects have to undergo a separate environmental assessment before being 
included into the master plan. Due to a stagnating demand, high investment costs and 
environmental concerns, only few projects are planned, most funds are made available for 
reinvestment.  
Unlike several other countries in the European Union with national airport ownership and 
airport groups, airports in Germany are owned and regulated by the federal states and local 
communities (some prominent exceptions with part privatisation are Hamburg, Frankfurt, 
Düsseldorf, Hannover, Terminal 2 in Munich) (von Hirschhausen, 2004). Planning and 
funding of these airports is therefore the responsibility of the states. The federal government, 
however, is on the one hand involved as a shareholder in a few airport companies and, on the 
other hand, is responsible for some general regulation issues. Presently there is a strong 
involvement of local communities to expand many regional airports following the successful 
example of Hahn airport which grew rapidly with the presence of the low-cost airline 
Ryanair. However, Heymann and Vollenkemper (2005) come to the conclusion that most 
regional airports will lack the critical mass to become profitable and will therefore swallow up 
subsidies in competition to attract airlines. From an economic point of view, investments into 
the larger airports that are operating at capacity limits is more efficient, but a general coherent 
investment strategy is made difficult by conflicting regional interests in the current 
decentralised system. The federal government developed such a integrated airport concept - 
including necessary inter-modal interchanges - for the first time in the year 2000 for 
consultation with the federal states which has not yet been proceeded further. 
 
The Transport Infrastructure Financing Agency  
Motivated by the results of a High-Level Commission (“Pällmann-Kommission”) on future 
financing of transport infrastructures, a multi-modal transport infrastructure financing 
agency (VFIG,  Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesellschaft) was established based on the 
„Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesellschaftsgesetzes“ (VIFGG) (transport infrastructure 
financing agency law) in 2003, going into operation in 2004. It is completely owned by the 
federal government and presently managed by civil servants from the ministry of transport. 
The major motivation for founding the VFIG was to create the institutional structures 
enabling and supporting transport infrastructure investments outside the general public budget 
and public accounting system. Its tasks are the financing and financial management of those 
aspects of the construction, maintenance and operation of transport infrastructure that are the 
responsibility of the federal level and the preparation and carrying out of PPP projects (A and 
F models, see below). One of the major advantages of the agency is that it is not bound by the 
public accounting system and has therefore more flexibility in transferring funds temporally 
and between investment activities. Secondly, a more transparent connection between user 
charges and investments into the infrastructure should be established. However, user charges 
from the HGV toll on motorways and inland waterway tolls are still collected by federal 
institutions and the VFIG receives these charges indirectly through the general federal budget. 
Therefore, three major issues are the subject of current debate (e.g. BDI, 2005):  
• the multi-modal character of the agency, allowing for transfers between modes 
according to political willpower, reducing public acceptance of user charging; 
• whether the agency should be allowed to be able to retrieve money from the capital 
market to raise funds; this issue is to be examined according to the coalition contract 
of the current government (CDU et al., 2005) 
• whether user charges should be earmarked and transferred directly and without being 
passed through the federal budget to the agency. 
However, since the HGV toll as one of the major sources of refunding is only operational 
since 2005, there is yet little empirical evidence to assess the performance of the agency. 
 
Fund raising methods 
General public budgets are the main source of funding for transport infrastructure 
procurement in Germany. This means that on the one hand most investments are funded 
through the public budgets, but also that on the other hand user contributions such as vehicle 
taxes and mineral oil taxes are generally not earmarked for use in the transport sector. 
However, there are several new financing instruments that have emerged in recent years 
which are closer to user funding. 
In the case of federal roads, there are three sources of funding: the public budget, the 
motorway tolling for heavy goods vehicles (HGV), and PPP (private-public-partnership) 
models. The public budget is fed by general taxation, including taxes raised from the road 
transport users, in particular fuel taxes and VAT on fuel. While the latter two taxes are federal 
taxes, the circulation tax is passed on to the federal states. In the 1960s, a federal road 
financing law was introduced with particular focus on the extension of the motorway system, 
requiring that a fixed part of the fuel tax base of that year, and by subsequent laws also of 
following fuel tax increases, is earmarked for the purposes of the road system. However, this 
requirement has been broadened annually since 1973 by budget laws to wider transport 
system uses, and tax increases in recent years have not been earmarked. Moreover, for several 
years now, due to the financial situation of the country, the amount of infrastructure 
investment has almost equalled Germany’s federal credits to finance the additional yearly 
debt (Rothengatter, 2005b).  
Hence, following the recommendations of the “Pällmann”-Commission in order to sustain 
transport investments in the long term, new instruments to gradually switch towards the user-
pays principle, the HGV motorway toll and two PPP models, have been introduced. The 
distance based HGV toll replaced a time based Euro-vignette scheme and should have been 
started in 2003. The toll is collected by means of an automatic, satellite navigation and mobile 
communications based system. Due to technical problems with this new type of system, the 
actual start was postponed until the beginning of 2005 leading to substantial decreases in 
revenues that had been foreseen for infrastructure investments. 
Since 1.1.2005 the heavy goods vehicles with a maximum permissible weight of at least 12 
tons are charged the HGV toll on the federal motorways. The average toll rate is 12.4 
Eurocents per kilometre, differentiated according to axles and emission classes. The basic rate 
has been determined based on the motorway renewal costs that are caused by HGV. These 
had been estimated in a study by Prognos and IWW (2002) to add up to 3.4 billion Euros in 
2003 and an average of 15 Eurocents per kilometre driven. The rate has been temporarily 
reduced to decrease the additional burden on the freight transport sector, after a compensation 
scheme for German forwarders was rejected by the European Commission. The charge is 
raised by means of a satellite based automated toll collection system which measures the 
exact number of kilometres driven based on transmitted GPS positioning data of the HGVs. 
The system is operated by a private sector company – Toll Collect – a joint daughter of 
Deutsche Telekom AG and DaimlerChrysler AG. The gross toll revenue for 2005 is estimated 
to reach 3 billion Euros in 2005; by the end of August 1.9 billion Euros had been collected 
(Törkel, 2005).  
According to initial experiences with the HGV-toll in Germany, the system is reported to 
work reliably,
2
 and has a high rate of compliance (Ruidisch et al., 2005) Results of an analysis 
of the diversion impacts have not been available at the time of this report.  
One major criticism of the German system is its high operating costs. Furthermore, although 
one of the basic demands of the “Pällmann”-Commission was to earmark the revenues from 
the HGV toll on motorways for infrastructure investments into the motorways, the federal 
government decided to take a multi-modal view and earmark the net revenues for transport 
infrastructure improvements with the larger share to be used for the road networks. It is fully 
transferred to the VFIG via the federal public budget. 
A third source of funds for road infrastructure investments are the two PPP schemes: the so-
called F- and A-models. The F-model is intended to allow private investments in special 
infrastructure sections such as tunnels and bridges. It foresees that construction, maintenance 
and operation plus financing are carried out through a private operator, whose sources of 
remuneration are direct tolls. Subsidies can be granted up to 20% of the building costs. From 
10 projects listed as potential candidates, only one F-model project has been realised (so far 
financially unsuccessful), a second one is close to completion, and four more are in the 
planning process. The A-model has been developed to facilitate private investments into the 
extension of motorways from 4 to 6 lanes, where the construction, maintenance, operation and 
financing is provided by the private operator who in turn is rewarded revenues from the 
HGV-motorway toll as a shadow toll. Since the expectation is that about half of the costs can 
be recovered through revenues, a subsidy of up to 50% for the construction costs can be 
granted. Five of these projects are currently in the tendering process. One of the major 
responsibilities of the new VIFG is to take over responsibilities in the preparation and 
execution of these PPP projects. Overall, there is little experience of these models as yet and 
hence they cannot be fully evaluated. However, it is expected that both kinds of models have 
only very limited potential for generating additional funding for road infrastructure in 
Germany (see e.g. Beckers et al., 2005, Rothengatter, 2005b).  
Refunding of federal rail infrastructure investments is achieved both through user charges 
and through public budgets. The track charging system of the DB Netz AG consists of three 
components: a basic track charge, a product factor and special factors. The basic charge is 
varied by multiplying with the product factor to distinguish between the qualities of the track. 
For high demand tracks a surplus of 20% is applied to redirect traffic to less congested tracks. 
Special factors are e.g. steam trains. In low demand areas regional factors increase track 
charges in order to improve the cost/revenue ratio. This price differentiation has been strongly 
criticised by the regions as a source of potential discrimination. These track charges are 
supposed to allow DB Netz AG to recover the annual depreciation of infrastructure 
investments. However, there is still strong public sector involvement in the rail sector: 
indirectly through the track charges of subsidised regional rail services 
(Regionalisierungsmittel) and directly through financial grants towards construction costs and 
to cover losses of DB Netz AG (see above). As compensation for the regionalisation of 
railway services, a fixed amount of funds is transferred from the federal general budget to the 
states (2002: 6.745 billion Euros; increased by 1.5% p.a. from 2003 on). KCW et al. (2005) 
estimate the subsidisation of the DB AG from state budgets at around 10 bill Euro with a total 
revenue of DB AG of 16 billion Euro in 2004 (62% state subsidies, investments and 
operation). Similarly the Scientific Advisory Board to the Ministry of Transport cites that DB 
AG has recorded revenues from track charges and fees of about 3 billion Euro (including the 
subsidised regional services) and estimating a gap in the cost recovery of 2.5 billion Euro 
which DB AG demands as state contribution (45%) (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 2005). 
On the state and community level, the major sources of funding transport infrastructure 
investments are public budgets. The states receive major parts of their budget through tax 
transfers from the federal institutions. For example, vehicle taxes and part of the VAT are 
redistributed based on fixed shares to the states and communities. In addition, a fixed budget 
                                                 
2 in the reduced version of 2005; the full functionality is only operational since 01.01.2006 
of € 1.67 billion is provided from the federal level for the improvement of transport 
conditions on the community level, of which 0.22% can be used by the federal level for 
research purposes according to the Gemeindeverkehrsfinanzierungsgesetz (Community 
Transport Financing Law). This fixed fund out of the general federal budget replaced the 
earmarking of 0.03 DM per litre on the mineral oil tax which was introduced in 1967, and in 
fact limited the available funds after 2002 (BMVBW, 2004). The budget for the states is 
divided between them according to their share of registered vehicles with some adjustments 
made for the “city states” (Berlin etc.) and new federal states. The funds are granted as a 
subsidy and share of total costs. The states have to apply for these funds with programmes for 
community road infrastructure investments (KStB Kommunaler Straßenbau) and for 
investments into public transport (non-DB infrastructure and vehicles). Besides, the federal 
level develops in cooperation with the states a complementary federal programme for 
investments into the railways. Laaser and Rosenschoon (2001) analysed income from and 
expenditure in the transport sector. General (without external costs) revenues are higher that 
expenditure, however, even after transfer of funds between federal levels, communities show 
a large deficit.  
Refunding of investments in inland waterways is partly through tolls and fees (e.g. for using 
locks), but mainly from the general federal budget. As in the case of rail infrastructure, part of 
this is financed through revenues from the mineral oil taxes in the framework of an integrated 
multi-modal approach. Partly due to historical reasons in international agreements, inland 
waterway shipping is exempt from mineral oil tax. 
The refunding of airport investments is mainly through user costs (landing charges etc.) and 
airport services (rents from retail etc.). Hopf et al. (2003) estimate for the 17 international 
airports in Germany in the year 2001 the infrastructure related costs of air traffic (airports and 
facilities, air traffic control, meteorological services) had been in total recovered from user 
costs. However, infrastructure developments at airports are still subsidised from state budgets 
and in particular is seen as critical for the recent development of expanding regional airports 
(see e.g. European Commissions decision on Charleroi airport). Smaller (regional) airports 
receive on average subsidies of 5.9 Euro for investments and 3.3 Euro for operation per 
passenger equivalent (Heymann and Vollenkemper, 2005). Since air transport is exempt from 
mineral oil tax and international flights exempt from VAT, this can be regarded as indirect 
subsidies from the general public budget. As privatisation is an increasing source of funding 
for investments in airports. Generally, the chances for success are as greatest for larger 
airports. However, there is felt to be some danger that larger airports can exercise their market 
power against the interests of their customers (airlines) and hence some form of price 
regulation seems necessary (von Hirschhausen, 2004). This would require a transfer of some 
regulatory power from the federal states to a central regulation agency for efficiency reasons.  
 
Lessons Learnt  
The German case study in particular reveals the challenges that lie in the co-ordination of 
investment decisions between different tiers of political decision making and state institutions 
plus private actors such as the rail network companies and private investors. Therefore, clear 
rules are necessary in the selection of projects for investments and there is also a need for a 
clear division of responsibilities. Co-ordination between different organisations is essential. 
Following the subsidiarity principle, as many decisions as possible should be taken at the 
regional level, with the federal level restricting itself to the more strategic goals. In particular 
in the road sector, this principle has to be re-established, including a revised division of 
funding sources.  
The second major challenge to be observed in this case study is the shift from general public 
procurement to a user charging oriented system. First steps have been taken with the 
introduction of the HGV motorway toll and the establishment of the VFIG, but there are still 
many open questions regarding this organisation, such as its multi-modal character, its 
political dependence and the issue of whether it should be able to borrow money from the 
capital market.  
Experiences with PPP schemes in Germany are limited. Not the least so, because an already 
dense transport networks exists such that extensions generate less additional benefit.  
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